

U. S.-Soviet Tie Feared in Britain

By Drew Pearson

ONE REASON for Prime Minister Macmillan's anxiety to confer with President Eisenhower immediately rather than wait until next winter was to head off an Eisenhower conference with Marshal Zhukov.



Pearson

An Eisenhower-Zhukov conference, the British fear, might pave the way for a sort of American-Russian understanding regarding various parts of the world, which would leave the other NATO allies out in the cold.

This specter of a close Russian-American understanding has hung over the British ever since the war years, has sometimes given them the diplomatic heebie jeebies. It began during the war when Stalin proposed to Churchill and Roosevelt that there be a division of the Balkans, Britain having a sphere of influence over Greece and Yugoslavia, Russia taking Bulgaria and Romania. Significantly, Russia has now bitten off exactly the same two countries Stalin wanted—Bulgaria and Romania.

Also during the war, Stalin proposed that Russia take a sphere of influence over Asia; the United States over all Latin America. Roosevelt said no. The Kremlin, however, has proceeded to bring a good slice of Asia under its Red wing, anyway.

Latterly, repeated noises have been coming out of Moscow, suggesting that the U. S. and U. S. S. R. could decide the world's problems if they operated face-to-face.

This was suggested during last summer's disarmament talks; again more pointedly during the worsening Near East crisis.

So far Secretary Dulles has spurned Moscow's overtures. Some of his advisers, however, plus many American military men, think the United States might make real strides for peace by talking to Russia direct—without deserting our allies.

Absent Ambassador

Congressman John Blatnik of Minnesota came back from Yugoslavia the other day where he found that, despite momentous events, the United States lacked either an ambassador or a No. 2 man on the job.

The Ambassador, Jimmie Riddleberger, has been in Washington, sitting on a board to decide on the promotion of career diplomats. The Counsel of Embassy, Norris Chipman, recently died.

In the interim, Tito had a vitally important visit from Marshal Zhukov, commander

of the Red Army and the man who will probably succeed Khrushchev. No top U. S. diplomats were on hand to report back to Washington.

Meanwhile, also, Yugoslavia decided to recognize East Germany, thereby causing West Germany to break diplomatic relations. No American ambassador was on deck in Belgrade to make Tito realize the consequences.

Blatnik found out from his own sources that Tito was at his hunting lodge preparing an important statement. The undermanned Embassy assured him, however, that Tito was simply hunting.

It turned out that the Congressman, who had been in the country only a few days, was better informed than the American Embassy. Shortly thereafter, Tito released an important statement declaring Yugoslavia's intention to recognize East Germany.

Mailbag

Buford Posey, Philadelphia, Miss.—Senator Stennis of Mississippi is a studious, hard-working, fair-minded Senator who does not go in for rabble-rousing. He rates high with his colleagues and is a credit to his state.

Boeing Aircraft Workers, Seattle—The plush plane No. KC-135, serial number 53-312 GA at hangar 2, which you have been ordered to rush to completion by Nov. 1, is not for President Eisenhower, even though it is called "Operation Speckled Trout."

It will carry instruments for making various hush-hush tests though it also will be used by various VIPs, including Gen. Curtis LeMay.

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STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN DCI AND CONGRESSMAN
JOHN A. BLATNIK ON 22 OCTOBER 1957 AT 1300 HOURS

B- "I met (Gazh ma blan) actually one day in the city."
D- "Whereabouts?"
B- "Ljubljana, up north."
D- "Oh, Ljubljana, I know where that is."
B- "I can start from ... to Ljubljana. We went up to Lake
(Bled) the second day, the third day down in ... our
peasant friends and over to Rijeka near (Op pa teer)--."
D- "That's right."
B- "Tito is coming to (La Banna)." 'Oh,' I said, 'what's
this, a big meeting?' 'No, no, he's going to his hunting
lodge.' Now, right away it's strange, he doesn't go to
Lake (Blaedder); his big palaces; he doesn't go to
(Re on i); he goes to this little hunting lodge, I know
just where it is, near (Kline). 'On a hunt?' 'No, he
must not be disturbed'--the exact quotes from Boris
(Criegler), President of Slovenia. I finally ran the lead
up that high. He gave me the real word. He says, 'We
are having difficult times and he must not be disturbed
for a week or ten days. He is writing an important
statement.' I don't know about what, but that's it. Ten
days later I end up down in Belgrade. There's no Ambassador

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there, he's sitting here on a promotion board. Zhukov is arriving, Tito is seeing nobody, and I asked our Embassy people, 'What's this ... Zhukov visit?' 'Well, it's a courtesy visit,' they said, 'in return to General (Goersh nik's).' I said, 'Courtesy, hell, for Christ's sake, one of the most powerful--."

D- "Like a diplomatic illness."

B- "Yes. I said, 'A powerful, ... brutal, ruthless but practical, realistic, competent, combat commander like Zhukov spend eight or nine days stalking up and down this teenie little country?' You know, you're taking time out to see a little bit of a Naval installation, I've seen some of them in Zadar and other places--."

D- "Oh, it's very significant, there isn't any question about that."

B- "I said, 'There's something wrong here and I haven't got any contact and I don't know what it is.' I said, 'About as social and courteous as is Jimmy Hoffa calling on a small little reluctant labor leader or a small little trucker businessman and saying, 'Bill, we're going to be friends, aren't we?' You know, just about that friendly and courteous. So, first, they weren't concerned so much and I said, 'What the hell is Tito doing out in a hunting

lodge?' 'Well, maybe he's hunting.' 'He's hunting, hell! He's writing an important statement and what could it be?' And to show you how little the Embassy knew, they said, 'Well, he was supposed to go to Moscow next month for their big Congress or something, I don't know what. That has been deferred until April. Maybe he's writing a speech for that.' I said, 'He should be writing a speech for next April.'

D- "He's a pretty good speech maker. He can make a speech--."

B- "Right. I said, 'With Zhukov coming in and he's hiding out in the woods there, he's writing a statement on something now.' Well, it came out on the recognition of East Germany which completely puzzled me, I never expected that. Number two, I talked to Jimmy Riedelburger here last Thursday, we had lunch together after we talked with Chris Herter. He's puzzled and I thought it was a significant point. He said, 'This is strange.' I said, 'What's that?' He said, 'You know, just a few weeks ago, perhaps even a month ago, the Yugoslavs concluded what was a most satisfactory trade agreement with Western Germany.' I said, 'That is interesting.' That, they would do voluntarily, they need trade and the Germans are in an excellent position to give them a good deal in machinery and the market is hard. Isn't it funny, they do that and then

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three weeks later, or whatever it is, turn around and recognize East Germany. Now, this man, I don't know who he is, I just picked it up upon my return, Newsweek for October 21st. Makes Tito, himself, vacationing in Slovenia, that's the most ... people we had and our Embassy had. He's writing a serious statement. The rest, he's correct that Zhukov did not get the hero-size welcome. I said, 'There's something underlying his visit, it's not a courtesy visit.'

D- "Yes, I saw that."

B- "The Yugoslavs are not happy about having him,' and I said, 'was he invited?' Well, they weren't quite sure. Sam, the second--."

D- "Hightower."

B- "But I think has been touching a few things that--. It's not that Yugoslavia is leaning here but the Russians have been playing after them and ... and jolting them and very--."

D- "And putting pressure on them."

B- "Very firm but subtle pressures on them."

D- "The pressure, the trouble is--look here--as I see it, I don't know, I don't think--Tito doesn't feel so strong in his own position. Yugoslavia, as a country, is not Communist. You know as well as I do--."

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- B- "Yes, that's my--85 % of the people clearly are for us."
- D- "And Tito knows that."
- B- "And all their ties have been with Americans."
- D- "That's his trouble, Tito knows that, that's his trouble. Tito doesn't want to come under the domination of Moscow, in my opinion, but he's very frightened of his position. I mean, you take the Djilas book, you probably read the Djilas book."
- B- "I read it three nights before I left. I understood the first fifth of it got completely lost from the rest of it, but I'll go into--."
- D- "And then Dudintsev, when Dudintsev said so forth and so on. He's kind of worried."
- B- "You, see, I tried to see Vladio. Vladio, I know, Djilas, I didn't. I would have seen him if this Zhukov business hadn't come up."
- D- "Yes. Well, you go ahead because I've got somebody waiting for lunch.. I'd like to sit down longer with you--."
- B- "And I'll just ... it--."
- D- "What's your time schedule? You're going right back to Minnesota now?"
- B- "I'm leaving either tomorrow afternoon or very early Thursday morning."

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D- "Yes. I don't think that--policy is not mine, that belongs to the State Department--but I don't think we're going to do anything drastic at the moment, I think it would be a mistake."

B- "No, but my main concern, Mr. Dulles, was this with you here--I wouldn't come here unless I had something to report and to help in whatever little way it may be or may not be."

D- "Well, in anyway you--."

B- "Number two, what worried me is here in that sensitive and important little area, we were not getting information. See, at least, our Embassy didn't seem to know what's going. I come back to talk to a high-level man like Chris Herter and he's learning for the first time. I asked him to be sure to have your people in on it. He had two men over there to sit in and Reidelburger was there and three of Chris' aides. I mean, at least, we be informed for our own interests, to protect our own interests, you see, on those things developing."

D- "What do you think we should do? I mean, what's your slant?"

B- "I couldn't give this with a ..., I can tell you what I think, which must be double-checked by people who know the whole picture."

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- D- "Right."
- B- "But I can think this--for four years, now--I know that Tito was terribly disappointed that he didn't come to America."
- D- "I know, I know that."
- B- "He wanted to come here before he went to Moscow."
- D- "Did you favor that or were you against it?"
- B- "I favored it but I also saw the practical difficulties. Now, I don't think and I told them so, I told it to his secretary, (Vil fan)--."
- D- "Yes, (Vil fan)."
- B- "Who made a special trip down from (La Banna) so we could talk together. Russia has been maneuvering Yugoslavia into a squeeze play. Tito is very sympathetic to Gromoko."
- D- "I think Khrushchev put the bead on him when they had that last meeting."
- B- "And, whatever happened, the stage was set and (Hugo) came in and put the clincher to it. I was told this that Tito was wondering, off the record informal talks, were the Russians blamed for the Hungarian revolution. And, I'm suspecting now that they're telling him, 'Now, look, we're having trouble in Poland and we're not going to have no GD more Hungarians around here if we can help

it, and you just be damned reasonable with this thing. You can't depend on those Americans and this and this, and we're going to be as fair as we can with you, but our interests come first. If you cross us up and give us any trouble, we know where the trouble comes from. It's you, for encouraging this thing that has given us all the headaches.' With all these pulls on the one side, now, here's a third misconception that upset me at our Embassy. I said, 'The Yugoslav ship is leaning heavily to the port side.' That's my observation, but he has one interpretation. So, Marcey says, 'That's because all the Yugoslavs are standing on the port side.' I says, 'No, that's because of all the activity from the Russian side is coming on the port side and what we ought to do is strike up the band on the starboard side. Even simple things, they've been wanting exchange of newspaper people, give them the exchange of students.' The University of Minneapolis Symphony was there when I was there that night, they were terrific. 'They don't want an aid program, they want a trade program, a three-year program'-- (Car dell) told me that--'the military is second importance to them. But,' he said, 'if you do continue to give us the

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aid'--which they openly admit was terrific in '51, '52, '53--'then it's off again, on again and now driblets.' (Car dell) told me, he said, 'Your military aid program right now just causes us difficulties.' I said, 'What do you mean?' He said, 'There's enough of it to expose us to severe criticism from those who aren't our friends.'

D- "You've got a (spare) part problem, that's the big problem."

B- "Yes, but not enough--,"

D- "If you've given them a lot of things, you can't cut off a (spare) part then make what you've given them--."

B- "But I say rather than for us to just sit back and wait and let Russia take all the initiative as she has for four years, we ought to be making some of these overtures. Not overtures, but openings for more communication between us which I am sure they would welcome and which I am sure is the only way we can build up to further increasing our relationship with Poland, and be primarily on the trade thing. They've been trying to get a ... loan from some copper mine for nine years and still haven't done it. Even a simple trade agreement whatever it may be; say, it's on a year-to-year basis. This would be a legitimate thing that Russia can not complain or--. Tito has a base to stand on and say what's wrong with that, we have a right to deal with anybody--."

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- D- "We have no interest in forcing the ... in the hands of Russia. I think there's no question about that. They made a mistake on East Germany and it really forced Adenauer's hand because he saw that if that went through and he did nothing then everybody would recognize East Germany. The chances then of unification were put off and you'd build up this puppet government in East Germany and so forth and so on. I don't think Adenauer had any real choice. I expected him to do it and I don't think he had any real choice. Look here, when are you coming back?"
- B- "I won't come back until January."
- D- "That's a long time."
- B- "But, in the meantime, ... me if something can be done. I think it would be up to people, at least, my conscious--."
- D- "Yes. The action side belongs to the State Department. It's my job to keep out of policy, but it is my job to try and bring the facts and analyze the facts and draw any conclusions from the facts that I can. That's my job. I'm doing my best, we've got quite a lot of problems."
- B- "Yes, I know."
- D- "I don't know about that but--."

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- B- "I was sorry I couldn't go down ... a few months ago. Porter Hardy came down, he had his committee with him--."
- D- "Yes, he did. We had quite a talk. We had started out with quite an argument, he didn't think we were doing much good here. We had a good talk though, he came around. He was honest about it and I think when he heard our problems, what we were doing and so forth, he changed--."
- B- "He's a little restrictive in his outlook because he hasn't had enough contact with ..."
- D- "Yes, I want to get him down here again because that's a committee that's very important in my life. All of Congress is."
- B- "I appreciate your time."
- D- "I'm sorry--."
- B- "I think I left a hat over in--."
- D- "I think I've got the hat."

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